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Abstract. 
Medical device interoperability has been identified as a key way of decreasing 
healthcare costs while improving patient care 
[1]
. This has lead to a shift towards 
placing more medical devices onto IT networks. However, placing medical devices 
onto an IT network may lead to additional risks to safety, effectiveness and security of 
the devices, the network and the data. IEC 80001-1 addresses the roles, 
responsibilities and activities that need to be carried out when managing these risks. 
In this article, we describe an exercise undertaken to assess the Medical IT Network 
risk management practice implemented within a hospital to control risk associated 
with a Clinical Information System. The level of compliance with the IEC 80001-1 
standard was determined using an assessment framework developed by the Regulated 
Software Research Centre (RSRC). The purpose of this exercise was, to test and 
inform the development of an assessment method that is part of the assessment 
framework for this standard, and also, to identify how the management of such an 
existing Clinical Information System (CIS) project meets the requirements of IEC 
80001-1.  
 
Introduction. 
CISs are computer-based systems that collect, store, process and present the clinical 
information required to deliver patient care. They assist clinical staff in implementing 
an evidence-based quality improvement process. We assessed the risk management 
processes used in the management of a CIS implemented in a 40 bed critical care unit 
in St James’s Hospital in Dublin, Ireland. The system is robust and in the ten years it 
has been running, there has been very little downtime associated with its use. 
To the casual observer it may appear as if the purpose of the CIS is to integrate data 
from the physiological monitors, ventilators, dialysis devices etc. into the critical care 
electronic patient record. It is true that the electro-medical devices at the bedside are 
interfaced, as are other systems such as Laboratory and the Radiology Information 
Systems. On closer examination it becomes clear that the computer at the bedside is 
also used to prescribe and document delivered medications, and is the repository of 
the medical and nursing notes. The system allows the doctors and nurses to combine 
information from different sources into one system, develop and implement bespoke 
screen configurations, calculate indices, and structure care plans. 
 
The primary aim of implementing the CIS was to deliver an evidence-based and on-
going clinical transformation programme. The process is clinically led and under the 
governance of the Director of ICU. It would be a mistake to think of CIS as a 
technology system that in itself brings benefits. As much consideration and planning 
was put into the processes that would govern the use of the system and the quality 
cycle it would support, as the technology itself.  
 
The CIS is a socio-technical system consisting of people, processes and technology 
that together deliver a care process that is standardised, measurable and operates 
within a quality cycle. In assessing the risk management processes employed in 
managing such a system, we need to not only look at the technical components but 
also the organizational and social issues surrounding the use of these systems. 
 
Risk management of clinical information systems that incorporate a Medical IT 
networks. 
A CIS brings many benefits however it also brings challenges, many of which are 
new for hospitals to deal with. As the clinical care process is predicated on the 
availability of the CIS, the reliability of the system as a whole needs to be assured. 
Therefore hospital networks, which form part of the CIS infrastructure, become as 
important to the delivery of patient care as the ventilators at the bedside. Any network 
outage can have an immediate impact on that care. 
 
Medical devices are stringently regulated prior to being placed on the market, and 
standards exist to guide those who manufacture and regulate these devices 
[2]
. 
Similarly standards exist to guide those who implement and manage information 
technology systems 
[3]
. However, in implementing a CIS a hospital will inevitably 
place a medical device onto an IT network and this may result in the device not 
behaving as intended, or the interaction of the device and other elements of the system 
may result in the system not behaving as expected. Either of these occurrences could 
have consequences for the safety, effectiveness and security of the system as a whole. 
To ensure that these consequences do not occur, a proactive risk management 
approach, involving all risk management stakeholders, is required throughout the 
lifecycle of the CIS and this approach needs to be informed by both good practice in 
Medical Device and IT System design and management.  
 
IEC 80001-1 (2010) 
[4]
 is a standard that details the roles, responsibilities and 
activities required to manage the risk of placing a medical device on an IT network. It 
defines a Medical IT Network as an IT Network that incorporates at least one Medical 
Device. Conformance with the standard requires the hospital to take ownership of risk 
management of a Medical IT Network. It also requires the hospital to appoint and 
resource a Medical IT Network Risk Manager who shall be responsible for the 
management and /or execution of the risk management process used to maintain the 
safety and effectiveness of the Medical IT-Network. This person should manage both 
internal and external communications and position in the organization should allow 
them to be able to report the result of risk management processes to the hospitals Top 
Management 
[4]
, typically the CEO. All stakeholders should be partners in ensuring 
the safety, effectiveness and security of the Medical IT Network and there should be a 
shared vision between them all. No method currently exists to allow hospitals to be 
assessed against the requirements of IEC 80001-1 standard.  
 
Risk management of the clinical information systems in St James’s Hospital. 
The governance and processes used to implement and manage the CIS in St. James’s 
were put in place in 2003 prior to the publication of IEC 80001-1. They have evolved 
over time in response to both the expansion of the system and the need to deal with 
issues as they arose.  
 
The system is under the governance of the Director of ICU and managed by a 
multidisciplinary team (MDT) convened by the Director of ICU. The MDT consists 
of doctors, nurses, pharmacists, laboratory scientists, information technology 
professionals and clinical engineers. A multidisciplinary care team is defined as “a 
group of health care workers who are members of different disciplines, each 
providing specific services to the patient” [5] and this accurately describes the activity. 
The only full time members of the MDT are two nurses who act as custodians of the 
configuration/application and provide on-going training, user support and system 
administration. The remainder of the team is drawn from their respective departments. 
Like other clinical care teams, it has a strong bias towards action with contributing 
staff involved in problem solving and service delivery. The MDT culture is strongly 
non-hierarchical, with staff from different backgrounds contributing to the scientific, 
managerial, and technical tasks, matching the skills available to the tasks in hand at 
any given time.  
 
The CIS multidisciplinary team has a role in performing risk management over the 
life of the system. The risk management programme is concerned with all aspects of 
the use of the system, not just those associated with the Medical IT Network upon 
which the system is built. It meets regularly to try and imaginatively foresee potential 
hazards and take steps to eliminate them as part of the on-going system design. 
Contingency plans are put in place to cover system failures that might occur for 
unforeseen reasons. Policies regarding user access, use of passwords, automatic log 
off, user roles etc. are strictly enforced and the usual protection from malware attack 
is implemented. The MDT also manages the change control required over the life of 
the CIS. 
 
As part of the CIS implementation there is a requirement to assure the veracity of data 
supplied from medical devices and other clinical systems. During commissioning of 
the CIS the interfaces were validated by clinical engineering 
[6]
. For the purposes of 
this work validation was considered as the confirmation by examination and the 
provision of objective evidence that the particular requirements for a specific intended 
use are fulfilled 
[7]
. Devices and systems were setup to produce a range of values for 
each particular test, this information was transmitted, and information presented to the 
end user was evaluated. Evaluation was two fold; Verification that content remained 
unchanged and verification that the message set had taken the correct information 
pathway, through the various interfaces and software mapping tools 
[8]
. This 
validation exercise required the hospital-based staff to work with the suppliers of the 
different system to learn the interface pathways and how to independently access 
them. This activity promoted the development of shared vision between the vendors 
and the hospital as to how risk would be managed.  Documentation included a 
description of the interfaces, outline of the testing procedure, testing acceptance 
criteria, copy of all test data sets used, End/End comparison tables and testing results.  
 
Methodology. 
The authors from the Regulated Software Research Centre (RSRC) team developed 
an assessment framework that was based not only on the IEC 80001-1 standard but 
also on the other standards that informed IEC 80001-1
[9-15]
. The resultant framework 
can be used to assess the performance of risk management activities through-out the 
lifecycle of a Medical IT Network. This framework includes a Process Reference 
Model (PRM), a Process Assessment Model (PAM) and an assessment method. In 
order to perform an assessment, an interview based upon a set of scripted questions 
was conducted for each process area. On the basis of the responses to these questions, 
a capability level can be assigned to each process. This allows strengths and 
weaknesses in current risk management processes to be identified and 
recommendations to be provided for actions to be implemented in order to improve 
the current risk management processes.  
 
The evaluation was conducted over a three month period and took the form of a series 
of meetings structured as an assessment. While the assessment method facilitates self-
assessment, in this instance the RSRC team who developed the framework undertook 
the role of assessors. Where there were difficulties in understanding or interpretation, 
both the RSRC and Hospital groups suspended the assessment process and worked 
together to clarify the issues. In this way the governance and management of the CIS 
was assessed, the assessment method was refined, and the questions that will be used 
during future assessments were also tailored to improve their suitability. 
 
Results and Discussion. 
In this paper we discuss our experiences in using the first draft of a proposed 
assessment method. On its own the PAM was difficult in interpret for those whose 
work practices are routed in hospital culture and based on Healthcare Technology 
Management 
[16]
. The assessment exercise was very informative both for the hospital 
and research teams. Using the PAM as a basis for the assessment forced the hospital 
team to familiarise themselves with practices common in industry and in turn learn 
from and, adapt these approaches to the hospital environment.  
The assessment took approximately five days to complete. A significant portion of 
that time was spent in learning about how to apply the standard and the associated 
assessment methodology. This aspect of the work was undertaken by the authors. In 
total the multidisciplinary team spent approximately one day working through the 
assessment methodology.   
 
Working closely with the hospital team also allowed the RSRC team to identify and 
understand the clinical engineering team’s particular role as risk management 
stakeholders and how risk is managed when placing a medical device onto the 
network, within the hospital culture.  
 
The approach used is based on the concept of the Process Assessment Model used to 
facilitate process improvement in industry. Consequently the terminology adopted 
was at times unfamiliar to hospital staff. This highlighted the need for more work to 
be performed to frame the questions in such a way as take cognisance of the hospital 
practice and culture.  
 
By far the greatest deficit of the hospital risk management process identified by the 
process assessment model was the lack of adequate documentation of policy. Where 
staff were assigned to the project full time (the application and support nursing staff) 
the documentation was better. Similarly processes undertaken as part of 
commissioning such as the validation of the interfaces were also well documented. 
However, members of the MDT who have primary roles in their own departments and 
contribute to the CIS management on a part-time basis rarely have time to document 
the risk management policy. This is not to say that the risk management was not being 
undertaken, rather that the documentation of the process was lacking.  
 
The Medical IT Network risk management was being undertaken within a wider CIS 
system risk management process. This wider process rightly prioritises elimination of 
hazards that might impact on patient care. When it came to assessing hazards 
associated with the Medical IT Network the same focus on the impact to patient care 
was evident. The probability of occurrence of potential hazards to the Medical IT 
Network was usually low compared to other hazards and often impossible for hospital 
staff to estimate. Consequently potential hazards were scored on their likely impact on 
patient care only. 
 
The use of 80001 raised awareness of the need for groups within the hospital to come 
together and address risk issue related specifically to network technology 
management. The assessment identified a weakness in how the risk management of 
the Medical IT Network is managed on an on-going basis. The management of the 
computers in the unit and the network was shared between the clinical engineering 
group and the information technology department but the specific roles undertaken by 
each were not clearly documented. The technical support to these components was 
delivered by the different departments using different models. Clinical engineering 
manage the devices at the bedside including the computers, interfaces and network 
connections. The information technology department manage the network 
infrastructure which is remote from the patient. They also manage the software on the 
bedside computer however this is more often than not done remotely. While both 
groups work well together, share information and contribute to the MDT, the 
management of the information technology components would be improved by 
implementing a single documented policy that set out how both groups would work 
together to manage these devices as a single system. 
 
The use of 80001 highlighted the need to address risk issues associated with the 
network technology management that had not been identified to date. A review of the 
vulnerability of the network technology to electrical power outage revealed that not 
all network components were protected by Uninterupable Power Supplies (UPS). 
Where UPS were in place their maintenance and quality assurance varied depending 
upon which group was responsible for them. Arising from this review, a 
multidisciplinary project was established with input from the information technology, 
facility engineering and clinical engineering groups to upgrade the power 
management of the network elements and the associated policy for their on going 
management. This project group also included a senior representative of the hospitals 
risk management team and the hospital Chief Operations Officer. While this project is 
started at the time of writing it is not complete. It is hoped that the inclusion of senior 
hospital managers in this group will ensure that there is corporate oversight of the 
importance of the project in ensuring the reliability of the system.  
 
IEC 80001-1 describes specific roles assigned to individuals such as the Medical IT 
Network Risk Manager. We found that in a number of cases the attributes being 
assessed were all in place but responsibility and resources distributed among a 
number of individuals who were part of the MDT. This made assessment difficult, 
although after detailed discussion it usually emerged that the processes being assessed 
were in place, but in a different way from that expected by the authors of the PAM.  
We found that during the planning and commissioning phase, the role of Medical IT 
Network Risk Manager as described in the standard was undertaken by the lead 
Clinical Engineer who acted as project manager for the implementation phase. Where 
major upgrades to the system were being undertaken, or the system expanded, this 
individual again assumed a project manager role. They acted not only as project 
manager but also as the synergist between the different professional groups 
contributing to the project (medical, nursing, ICT, finance and procurement) and also 
the system and medical device vendors. In doing so, they fostered the shared vision 
between all the stakeholders that is one of the requirements of IEC 80001-1. Within 
the procurement documentation, there was clearly evidence that detailed consideration 
had been given to risk management of the Medical IT Network. The risk management 
process associated with the on-going development of the application as part of the 
MDT quality cycle was undertaken by one of the two full time nursing staff assigned 
to the project. This Lead Informatics Nurse had risk management of the application 
named in her job description, and risk management was a recurring agenda item for 
the MDT, which meets every two weeks.  
 
The standard also highlights the need for clear Responsibility Agreements 
[4]
 to be put 
in place between the hospital and the vendors who are contracted to supply or support 
the CIS system. These were in place as a result of the application of standard 
Healthcare Technology Management practice and took the form of service contracts. 
The contract with the main system supplier included provision for the company 
representative to participate as required in the CIS MDT in the provision of advice 
regarding change control and on-going application and risk management support. 
Again this highlighted how the management fostered the development of a shared 
vision between all stakeholders. The review of compliance with the responsibility 
agreements prompted a review of the need for internal Memorandums of 
Understanding between different departments who contribute to the CIS project. We 
found that there was a need to formalise the arrangements between different 
departments within the hospital who contributed to the MDT. Often the activity and 
responsibility was more closely associated with the individual rather than the 
department they represented and this posed challenges when staff members changed 
their role or left the organisation.   
 
The success of the MDT in implementing good risk management processes has 
resulted in a system that is useful and robust. This has been achieved as a result of 
committed individuals who have worked well together to deliver the socio-technical 
system. This success masks the need for the institution to invest in a necessary 
resource to build, maintain and document the risk management process that such 
systems clearly require. The standard rightly identifies a role for corporate 
management in establishing the governance and structures to support this. However, 
the drivers for these systems are more often than not clinical and they tend to evolve 
and grow out of practice at the unit level. To that extent, they develop bottom up, 
rather than top down. The assessment helped us to identify this. The fact that the 
Director of ICU is responsible for risk management of the Medical IT Network, which 
is part of the wider hospital network, highlights that in hospitals the necessary 
changes in governance structures tend to lag behind the development of novel 
technologies and systems. 
The following table shows an overview of the results of the assessment performed in 
St. James’s Hospital and lists the recommendations made to address any weaknesses 
which were identified as a result of performing the assessment. These results are 
presented in the context of how current risk management processes address the key 
deliverables identified in the IEC 80001-1 standard. 
Policies: 
Policies for:  Assessment Result: Recommendations 
Risk Management 
Process 
No documented policy in 
place 
Document risk 
management policy 
Risk Acceptability Criteria No documented risk 
acceptability criteria 
Establish risk acceptability 
criteria 
Balancing the 3 key 
Properties with the 
mission of the 
Responsible Organisation 
Key properties are 
balanced on a case by 
case basis. No 
documented policy for 
balancing the key 
properties. 
Establish policy to balance 
key properties with 
mission of RO. 
Resources: 
Resources for:  Assessment Result: Recommendations 
Provision of adequate 
Resources  
Adequate resources 
employed in 
Multidisciplinary team 
Ensure resources 
continue to be aware of 
responsibilities 
Assignment of Qualified 
Personnel 
Resources are 
adequately qualified to 
represent perspective of 
all risk management 
stakeholders 
Ensure all stakeholder 
groups continue to be 
represented 
Appointment of Medical IT 
Network Risk Manager 
Role has been informally 
assumed by Clinical 
Engineering 
Formalise position as 
Medical IT Network Risk 
Manager 
Enforcement of 
Responsibility 
Agreements 
Responsibility 
agreements in place and 
functioning well 
Continue to monitor 
performance of 
responsibility agreements 
Risk Management Process 
Risk Management 
Process:  
Assessment Result: Recommendations 
Clear Connection to other 
processes 
Multidisciplinary team 
gives oversight of other 
Use of Multidisciplinary 
team gives connection to 
processes other processes 
Ensuring continuing 
stability and effectiveness 
Bring emphasis from 
project to ongoing risk 
management 
Ensure project best 
practice is used in day to 
day risk management of 
Medical IT Network 
Reviewing results at 
defined intervals 
Not currently reviewed Ensure results of risk 
management processes 
are reviewed at defined 
intervals. 
Table 1 - Assessment Results Summary 
 
Following the assessment a number of improvements have been implemented. The 
clinical engineering and information technology groups have completed a shared 
mapping exercise to clearly identify all technical components of the network and 
describe how the network is configured. The MDT held formal meetings with the 
system supplier to review the responsibility agreements and also share information 
pertinent to risk management processes. In general the risk management of the system 
is given a higher priority at MDT meeting and processes associated with change 
control have been reviewed and improved. 
 
Conclusions. 
IEC 80001-1 is valuable to hospitals.  It sets out the people and processes that need to 
be in place for a hospital to undertake risk management of Medical IT Networks. It 
provides a framework for discussion between those who are advocates for risk 
management of Medical IT Networks and Top Management. However, at first reading 
the specific provisions detailed in the standard may be difficult to map onto existing 
hospital structures.  
The assessment helped the hospital to identify and protect strengths in the current risk 
management processes and to identify opportunities for improvement and implement 
these improvements (Fig. 1).  
 
Since compliance with IEC 80001-1 is measured by inspection of the documentation 
the hospital has in place, it is clear that for hospitals to become compliant, they will 
have to change how they support such systems to allow for the complete risk 
management process to be put in place and documented. 
 
Within St James’s Hospital the MDT provides an excellent forum within which risk 
management activities can be undertaken. This works best during project phases 
where the members concentrate on achieving a particular milestone and there is a 
clear project manager who assumes the role of Medical IT Network Risk Manager. 
The assessment highlighted that on-going risk management of the Medical IT 
Network could be improved but this would require more resources to deliver this as 
part of an on-going process, not just during go live to upgrade projects.  
 
The use of 80001 not only raised awareness of the need for groups within the hospital 
to come together and address issue related to network technology management but 
prompted actions which are currently being implemented. 
 
To meet both of the objectives set out above, those developing CIS systems in a 
bottom up fashion and in response to clinical need, will need to act as advocates with 
corporate management for the necessary resources to adequately manage these 
systems. This is particularly so as the complexity and prevalence of Clinical 
Information Systems increases.  
 
The interaction between the RSRC and Hospital teams allowed the questions used in 
the assessment method to be rephrased in a way that acknowledged the existing 
hospital processes and culture, and this work is on-going. One of the authors is the 
international project leader for a technical report (IEC 80001-2-7) which is currently 
under development which contains the assessment method, PRM and PAM developed 
as part of this work. This technical report will allow Healthcare Delivery 
Organisations to self assess their conformance with IEC 80001-1. The trialing of the 
assessment method in St James’s Hospital has allowed the researchers to gain an 
understanding of current risk management practices within a Healthcare Delivery 
Organisation in a specific context and has allowed the development of an assessment 
method that can tailored to address varying Healthcare Delivery Organisation 
contexts. 
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